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The American bioethics movement, developed in the 1960s,
was strongly nurtured by religious concerns and motivations.
These concerns emphasized personal values and beliefs along
with religious and cultural traditions. The religious perspective
emphasized care, competence and compassion, the three Cs
essential for any adequate health system. Over the past ten or
twenty years the American bioethics movement has been
secularized in three distinct assaults on its original religious foundations. The latest assault, driven primarily by economic motivations and social utility, is surely the most threatening, not just
to the bioethics movement but to the practice of medicine. I
will illustrate this by focusing on how our society deals with endof-life clinical decisions particularly in light of the Cruzan decision (end-of-life decisions for incompetent patients).
My point here is that the process our society employs to make
decisions for very sick and incompetent patients - our most
vulnerable patients-will strongly influence decision-making for
all patients and determine the kind of medicine and medical profession we have in the future.
I suggest that 1990 was a watershed year in American
bioethics. We witnessed two events: the Supreme Court decision in the Cruzan case and Congress passing a bill called "The
Patient's Self-Determination Act of 1990:' These will be regarded
s the highwater mark of patient self determination. From now
on, I predict, we will see increasing efforts to withdraw decisionmaking authority, initially from incompetent patients and their
families and then from competent patients also. Decision-making

control will be taken from individuals by several methods, but
they will have the same goal: to profoundly reduce the strength
of individuals' personal subjective values and to place enormous
decision-making authority in the hands of third parties. Not third
parties, mind you, like family or even physicians, but third parties such as payers, regulators and government.
My plan then is to examine these two related theses in the
following way. First, I would like to look at the religious roots
and origins of the American bioethics movement and to briefly
note the three secular assaults that have b~en directed against
traditional bioethics. Those assaults are a value-free philosophical
tradition, a legalistic tradition, and most recently economics and
efficiency.
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The relationship between medicine and theology has been an
intimate and even inseparable one going back to the Hippocratic
Oath and forward into the Christian era. A similar close relationship existed between theology and the renewed interest in
contemporary bioethics of the 1960s. First, a tradition of medical
ethics had been sustained over the past fifty or seventy-five years
in denominational medical schools and hospitals. Second, many
of the original teachers of bioethics in the 1960s were chaplains
or clergy who served as campus ministers in medical schools.
Many of them shared an interest in influencing the education
of physicians to make them more sensitive to human values and
ethics. And finally, most of the early intellectual leaders of the
American bioethics movement were theologians such as Richard
McCormick, Joseph Fletcher, Paul Ramsey, James Gustafson.
Their students included James Childress, Gene Outka, Al
Johnson and Stanley Hauerwas. Their interest in ethical issues
in medicine and in human values in medical education was based
on their spiritual and ethical concerns.
That first generation of American bioethicists has gradually
been supplanted or, at the least, heavily complemented by a second wave of academics whose primary disciplines have been
philosophy, law, and more recently, economics and health policy.
The shift in focus from a theological perspective to this legal,
philosophical, economic focus is a phenomenon I refer to as the
secularization of American bioethics. Theological understandings
of medical ethics emphasized a sense of community and the
obligations and responsibilities of physicians to individuals and
the community. It enunciated an ethic of giving and receiving,
of caring, of helping, and the moral principle-a medical responsibility principle premised on covenantal, interpersonal and community relationships between physicians and patients and between the medical profession and society. This was an ethic of
medicine appropriate to a human relationship between friends
or colleagues. It emphasized the values and beliefs of the participants, both patients and physicians.
By contrast, the secular movement headed up by philosophers,
legal scholars and economists, has stressed a legalistic and efficiency model of medical ethics which holds that moral conduct
is a matter of following rules, and moral relationships consist
of duties and rights determined by these rules. This model, emphasizing social utility, is appropriate to govern interactions of
strangers and of bureaucratic relationships within institutions and
organizations.
I have deep concerns that a legalistic view of medical practice
is a limiting, inadequate, and undesirable conception. If medicine
is conceived as a practice of strangers-or even worse,
estranged-and if it ignores or overrides the values of individuals,
if it arouses suspicion and distrust on the part of patients and
doctors, then medicine will be controlled and regulated. Rules
and laws will be substituted for the kind of trust and confidence
that previously existed between doctor and patient. Unfortunately,
this creates a downward spiral in the relationship between
doctors and patients. Distrust encourages rules and regulations
which tend to arouse the enmity of the professional and result
in mutual suspicion and recrimination. It would be more appropriate to bring back to medical ethics the theological perspective on medicine as a covenantal relationship between doctor
and patient. This model would supplant legalistic theory with
a system premised on promise-keeping, indebtedness, justice,
fidelity, and human responsibility, and would respect individual
values and preferences.
I turn now to what I call "The Three Ages of Medicine:' The
history of the doctor-patient relationship in Western medicine
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can be divided into three periods. The first period I call "The
Age of the Doctor:' It lasted from about 500 B.C. to 1965 A.D.
The second period I call "The Age of the Patient" from 1965
to October 1, 1983, which some of you may remember is t
date on which DRGs became the law of the land. The current
age I call "The Age of the Payer:' Sometimes I call it "The Age
of Bureaucratic Parsimony:' The key point about the three ages
is, Who calls the shots? In the first two ages the doctor and the
patient made the decision. Whatever tension emerged had to
do with where, within the relationship between the two, ultimate
power would reside, although this was usually settled by negotiation and accommodation.
But the third age, I suggest, is different. In this, the age of
the payer, the decision-making power has begun to shift from
those who provide care-doctors, hospitals, patients and their
families-to those who pay for the care. The payers are both
private and government payers who increasingly demand accountability and limit decision choices. In contrast to the first two
ages, the new system limits decision-making freedom for both
doctors and patients. It is based increasingly on efficiency and
economics and social utility, which have emerged rapidly as key
elements in decision-making.
Against this backdrop of the history of the doctor-patient relationship, I wish to discuss end-of-life decisions for incompetent
patients. A case is now unfolding in St. Paul, Minnesota-the
case of Helga Wanglie, an eighty-seven-year-old woman who has
been lying in the Hennepin County Hospital in a persistent
vegetative state since May, 1990. Her physicians recommend
that the ventilator that keeps her breathing be stopped, but Mrs.
Wanglie's family, consisting of her husband and two adult sons,
refuse to authorize stopping the ventilator.
Why did they refuse? Her husband said that he did it to adher
to Mrs. Wanglie's strong religious beliefs and her previously expressed wishes. He is quoted in a court document as saying that
she told him, "If I cannot speak for myself, don't do anything
to shorten or take my life:' Now the hospital and doctors are
planning to go to court to override Mr. Wanglie's expressed wishes
for his wife on the grounds that Mrs. Wanglie's treatment is futile.
Decision-making for incompetent patients is a troubling ethical
problem. In fact, to my mind, it has been the troubling ethical
problem for the last fifteen or twenty years, at least since the
Karen Quinlan case of 1976. Incompetent patients include not
only patients like Mrs. Wanglie, but also patients who, though
conscious, have severe and irreversible brain impairment such
as Alzheimer's disease or even congenital mental retardation.
There are large numbers of such patients. Because these patients cannot speak for themselves, courts and legislatures, at
least since 1976, have developed an approach to end-of-life decisions that allows parties - surrogates - to make decisions for the
incompetent person.
The underlying assumption that permits surrogate decisionmaking in this country is that incompetent patients have a right
to self-determination similar to that of competent patients. The
basic rule here is that one employs a substitute-judgment standard. By substitute judgment, the courts have meant that one
tries to substitute one's own judgment for what the judgment
of the now-incompetent would be if the incompetent were able
to speak for himself or herself.
There are ways we can discover the incompetent person's judgment. People can write us things in advance such as Living Wil\
or other directives. People can talk to us or to their doctors and
continued on page 6
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percent; metorrhagia (bleeding between periods) less than 7 percent; always a few cases of amenorrhea (no periods at all).
Overall, fewer than 20 percent of patients will have some sort
of problem. Some patients can cope with irregular bleeding, some
cannot.

Can N orplant be removed before five years?
Women often ask, May I change my mind before the five years
are up and have the Norplant taken out? And what long-range
effects on fertility does it have? Yes, Norplant can be removed,
and the patient's body recovers its normal fertility.

Who are candidates for Norplant? How is it used
clinically?
Those of us in reproductive medicine have found Norplant
a very interesting and useful addition to our armamentarium.
:-Iowever, we should not single out Norplant, because the subject we're discussing concerns any contraceptive agent, whether
IUD or oral. N orplant is one of the few devices that was subjected to large-scale clinical trials before being released in the
United States. It was conceived in 1966 by the Population Council in New York, which explored various possible implant
methods for contraception. In Chile some of the initial implants,
made of silicone rubber, were used in 1968. Then in 1974 we
had the development of early prototypes of levonorgestrel progesterone in a sylastic-type system. In 1975 a multinational Phase
III began. This is the final stage before a new product is released
for public consumption. In 1983 Finland approved the use of
Norplant, being the first country to do so. This move was
followed by preintroduction trials in 1984 and 1985 in various
countries, including Sweden. In the United States, Norplant has
been released and available only recently, around December,
1990 to January 1991.
Norplant is a sylastic capsule which, when placed in the arm
of the woman, slowly releases progesterone. Similarly, IUDs containing various progesterones have been put into the uterus.
Norplant contains very effective levels of levonorgestrel compound, which prevents conception for up to five years. It works
by inhibiting ovulation. It will affect cervical mucus, thus inhibiting sperm transport, and there may be additional effects
upon the endometrium and other systems. The pregnancy rate
among Norplant users is well below 1 percent.

What problems are caused by this contraceptive?
Because we are giving pure progesterone, there will be bleeding
rregularities and possible headaches. However, statistics show
that from 75 to 80 percent of users have continued to use it.
Women should be warned that Norplant will likely cause some
irregular bleeding: menorrhagia (heavy bleeding) less than 10

It is ideal for long-term family planning for those who want
to avoid permanent sterilization. An estimated 25 percent or
more of women who have permanent sterilization-tubal
ligations-will want a reversal of that procedure, and the situation is never as good as it was before, even in the best of hands.
Norplant is recommended for women who are not candidates
for IUDs, women who have had trouble with other contraceptives, and women who are concerned about taking estrogen.
(This is a pure progesterone.)
With the noncompliant patient we get into legal problems.
Various judges have ruled on the use of Norplant for these patients. Norplant has been used not only for contraception, but
also for patients who have had therapeutic abortions and for
postpartum protection if not breast feeding, or at six weeks if
the patient is breast feeding and wants to discontinue it.

What are some of the contraindications for its use?
Blood clots, active thrombophlebitis or thromboembolic
disease, bleeding, active liver disease or tumors, and breast
cancer. However, we use Norplant in some patients where the
risks of pregnancy outweigh the risks of contraception. Needless
to say, we would not want to give this drug to a pregnant patient.

How is Norplant applied?
This is accomplished in a simple 10-15 minute office procedure. A trocar will be placed under the skin after the patient
is adequately anesthetised, usually with a local anesthetic. Then
the needle is placed under the skin of the upper arm, and a capsule is slid into each of the six arms that fan out from the trocar.
The arm is bandaged for compression for the first few hours.
By pressing one end it is possible to see where the implants are.
To remove them in five years or before, the physician makes a
small incision in the skin over the ends and pulls them out.

What are the advantages of N orplant?
It is highly effective, lasting up to five years. It is convenient
and easy to use, and does not affect coitus. Upon removal there
3

is a rapid return to fertility. Needless to say, once Norplant is
in, you have a very low annual maintenance cost for this device.
What are the disadvantages?
It is a progesterone, and some patients will have minor progesterone side effects. The major side effect of continuous progesterone is irregular bleeding, which is a major cause of discontinuance. It does require a minor surgical insertion and removal
and, of course, a little expense.
What about the patients who use Norplant?
Of 80 percent of those who use Norplant, 95 percent are
satisfied with the method. Over 70 percent want to use it again,
and 90 percent recommend it to their friends. It is an excellent
device that has been added to our armamentarium for contraception. My plea is, let us not allow the legal system to damn this
important contraceptive device that we have available. •

Contraception and Coercion:
Theological Reflections
By
David R. Larson, D.Min., Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Christian Ethics
Faculty of Religion
Director, Center for Christian Bioethics
Loma Linda University

What do dates, acacia tips, olive oil, cedar oil, distillate of copper, ointments of lead, frankincense, and crocodile dung have
in common?
Two things at least: All have been ingredients in recipes concocted to prevent conception. And the recipes of which they
were a part have all been condemned by prominent theologians
of the Christian heritage.
For hundreds of years Christian theologians, Catholic and Protestant, condemned these contraceptives not because they were
ineffective or even dangerous, but because they feared the compounds might actually work. Few things could be morally worse,
they contended, than for Christian husbands and wives intentionally to prevent offspring that would otherwise issue from their
sexual encounters. Even the practice of coitus interruptus was condemned by Catholic and Protestant thinkers as an unnatural,
unbiblical, immoral attempt to murder subsequent generations
before conception. Someone who would kill another human being without just cause acts wrongly, many reasoned. How much
worse when a couple severs the great chain of life by preventing
the conception of children, grandchildren, and so on till the end
of time!
One significant source of theological opposition to contraception was a document entitled The Good ofMarriage that Augustine
of Hippo circulated before he died early in the fifth century. It
is no exaggeration to say that this essay, written by a formerly
promiscuous celibate, who is famous for the prayer, "Oh Lord,
our hearts are restless until they find their rest in Thee;' and
perhaps not quite as famous for his prayer, "Oh Lord, give me
4

chastity but not yet;' is to this moment the most influential document other than the Bible in the history of Western Christian
sexual thought. In The Good ofMarriage, Augustine presents the
"holy trinity" formula of traditional Christian sexual ethics.
cording to this, although marriage is spiritually inferior to celibacy,
it is good in that it (1) produces offspring, (2) fosters fidelity,
and (3) enables Christians to experience sacramental grace.
Augustine thought that before the Fall there might have been
a nonsexual way for human reproduction to occur, even as Jesus
of Nazareth was conceived without human intercourse. But in
this world of sin, marriage is good to a certain extent because,
among other things, it results in the conception of beings who
eventually become children and adults.
Although some throughout the centuries opposed the traditional Christian view that the proper purpose of sexual union
is procreation, not until the first portion of the twentieth century did Protestant theologians in significant numbers look upon
contraception with moral approval. Their views were prompted
by improvements in contraceptive measures, worries about the
exploding population, concern for those whose lives were virtually crushed by the responsibilities of parenting too many
children, a growing sensitivity to the rights of women, and a
recovery of a more Hebrew and Islamic understanding of the
unitive as well as the procreative purpose of sexual intercourse
in marriage. Official Roman Catholic doctrine has not yet changed, even though millions of Catholic laypersons use contraceptives and thousands of parish priests do not condemn them for
doing so. One can only hope and pray Roman Catholic leaders
will see light in making a change that their Protestant brothers
and sisters in Christ have already made.
In view of the ethical poverty and perversity of much traditional Christian thought regarding contraception, it would be eas;
to dismiss any theological cautions about the use of Norplant
as yet another instance of predictable moral retardation. I hope
this will not be the fate of the reservations I wish to express
about Judge Howard Broadman's decision in California's Tulare
County. As a condition of eventual parole, he required Darlene
Johnson, a poor, uneducated and pregnant twenty-seven-yearold Afro-American single parent of four who has pled guilty to
child abuse, to accept this recent contraceptive device. My worry
is not that Norplant is contraceptive, but that in this instance
the required use of Norplant may be excessively coercive.
From a Christian point of view, we may describe the moral
purpose of medicine as the attempt through scientifically sound
measures to protect, preserve, enrich and enhance the image
of God in human life without regard to differences in race, gender,
economic class, personal beliefs, nationality or age. The formal
image of God in humanity, according to the three Abrahamic
religions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, is the greater capacity
for entering into meaningful relationships with other creatures
and with the Creator that human persons enjoy, because of their
greater rational capacities, than do nonhuman animals on planet
Earth. It is this capacity to be self-aware, self-determining, and
self-directing, and to be so not in individualistic isolation but
in intentional and intense companionship with others and with
the Supreme Other, that the three monotheistic religions call
the image of God. It is what one of the founders of Loma Linda
University called the "power to think and to do:' From this
perspective, a medical intervention is morally praiseworthy to
the degree that it nurtures the image of God as presentl)
understood. Conversely a medical intervention is ethically
troublesome to the degree that it tarnishes or damages the divine
image in human life.
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The Darlene Johnson case makes me uneasy for at least five
reasons. First, I fear that Judge Broadman's decision confuses
the difference that ought to remain between a preventive and
'\ punitive measure, with the judicial system more responsible
for punishment than for prevention. This is a relatively minor
consideration, but one worth noting. Secondly, I fear the decision unwittingly seduces medicine and health care providers into
serving as agents of the state instead of advocates for their
patients. A third apprehension is that such sentences may be
inflicted more frequently upon the disadvantaged than upon the
privileged members of the community, even when their crimes
are similar. This is troublesome from a theological point of view
that values the image of God in each person without regard to
the distinctions humans impose upon themselves. A fourth concern is that I do not see a direct connection between Darlene
Johnson's difficulties with being a successful parent and Norplant
or any other contraceptive device. If Judge Broadman had required a drug that would have enabled her to be as calm and
considerate to her children as most mothers wish to be, I might
be more easily convinced. By her own admission, Darlene
Johnson sometimes loses control of her emotions and hurts those
she loves. The first priority would seem to be to enable her to
experience greater self-awareness, self-determination, and selfdirection. Norplant is certainly related to this priority, but, it
seems to me, only indirectly so. Perhaps a psychotherapist could
be more helpful to her now than a gynecologist. A final consideration is that there is some evidence that neither Darlene
Johnson nor an appropriate proxy understood precisely what she
agreed to when she consented to the use of Norplant. If this
evidence is persuasive, it is damning. To impose a medical intervention upon a competent individual without his or her free
.nd informed consent, or to impose it upon an incompetent person without the free and informed consent of a competent and
proper proxy, is to use medicine to decrease rather than to increase the human capacity for self-determination.
I conclude with a sense of pain for Darlene Johnson and for
her children. She is not the person she wants to be, I feel certain. She is not the person we would like her to be either. By
her own admission, she is a mother who is capable of savagely
beating her own youngsters with belts and extension cords. When
dealing with such a vulnerable and sorrowful member of the
human family, it is easy for us to feel superior and then to be
overly cute and clever in our judicial and moral responses. I hope
we find it within ourselves to resist that temptation because it
is sinister, especially for those who understand the moral purpose of medicine. •
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A Legal Perspective
By
E. Gerrie Schipske, R.N.P., J.D.
Consultant Faculty, Women's Health Care
Nurse Practitioner Prpgram
Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology

Harbor-UCLA

"No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully
guarded ... than the right of every individual to the
possession and control of his own person:' - Union
Pacific Railroad v. Botsford (1891)
"Would we allow the police to search the sacred
precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the
use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to
the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship:' - Griswold v. Connecticut (1965)
"We are two-legged wombs, that's all; sacred vessels,
ambulatory chalices:' - Margaret Atwood, The Handmaid's 10Ie (1986)
"Women have good reason to rethink their contraceptive options. Newly approved Norplant offers
five years of no-fuss, 99.8 percent reliable protection:' - US News and World Report (December, 1990)
Imagine that a California Superior Court Judge orders a woman
convicted of child abuse to have a birth-control device implanted
in her upper arm for three years as a condition of her probation.
Imagine that a Florida County Circuit Court rules that a
seventeen-year-old, who admits smothering her newborn in the
process of concealing that she was pregnant, must use birth control for ten years following her release from prison.
Consider the scenario of an Arizona Superior Court Judge requiring the lifetime use of contraceptives for a seventeen-yearold mother of two, who pleads guilty to child neglect charges.
Or an Indiana Court ordering the sterilization of a thirty-yearold woman with a history of personality disorders, after she pleads
guilty to felony child neglect. (Her four-year-old had died due
to an overdose of psychiatric drugs prescribed for her.)
Picture an editorial in The Philadelphia Inquirer entitled: "Poverty
and Norplant-Can Contraception Reduce the Underclass?"
which proposes that perhaps welfare mothers should be given
incentives to have a birth-control device-Norplant-surgically
implanted in their arms.
Fictional scenarios of judicial eugenics?
Hardly.. The threat of coerced birth control is neither remote
nor fictional. It is upon us. The scenes presented above all occurred within the last three years. Not so coincidentally, women
are also being criminally prosecuted for their behavior and conduct during pregnancy and are also being forced in some instances to undergo undesired surgical procedures, such as
caesarean section and blood transfusion.
Despite constitutional rulings affirming both the basic "value
of reproductive autonomy over a majoritarian decision in favor
of sterilization" and the "right of the individual, married or single,
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to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusions into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether
to bear or beget a child;' more and more lower court judges are
turning to a type of unconventional sentencing which not only
denies women their right to privacy and control over their own
bodies, but denies them the equal protection of the Fourteeneth
Amendment by discriminating against them solely on the basis
of their ability to bear children. Certainly, there is a "compelling
state interest" in the prevention of child abuse and neglect.
However, the state must protect that interest in the least intrusive
manner. Moreover, it is highly questionable that coerced birth
control in any way stops an individual from abusing her children.
Because these judicial rulings are made at the lower level,
defendants, who are mostly poor, black, and addicted to alcohol
and/or drugs, rarely challenge the constitutionality of their
sentences.
It has been suggested that the resurgence of the government's
assault upon the womb and the bedroom is attributable to its
self-perceived impotence in dealing with the problems of poverty,
child abuse and substance abuse-particularly among women.
A more feminist view, however, offers that this assault is part
of a growing backlash by those who feel that women should be
punished whenever they do not conform to patriarchal
stereotypes-stereotypes which solely define women in
reproductive and maternal terms. Although these stereotypes
were fiercely and somewhat successfully challenged when women
demanded their right to safe abortion, the fight to control the
bodies of women who become pregnant and mothers and who
fail to fit these stereotypes, apparently still rages on in our lower
courts.
Inevitably, the constitutionality of coerced birth control will
be reviewed by the United States Supreme Court. In the interim,
reproductive health providers must ask themselves, how far, if
at all, are we willing to participate in delivering this form of
punishment?
Unlike other medical specialties, reproductive health presents
such a precarious opportunity to likewise act "paternalistically"

and perhaps "punitively" toward a patient-imposing our own
personal biases, thereby denying the patient her right to remain
autonomous. What is so dangerously enticing about the insertion of Norplant in a woman's upper arm is the delusion th(]
because its placement site makes it easy to verify her compliance,
somehow it is less intrusive of a woman's privacy than ordering
her to use other forms of contraception. (And certainly less
distasteful than checking on the use of a condom by her male
partner.)
Assisting in carrying out a court order for compulsory sterilization or contraception certainly jeopardizes both the "informedconsent" model of care and the traditional relationship between
the provider and the patient which is based upon trust and confidentiality. Furthermore, it deprives health-care providers of their
professional discretion to treat and prescribe on the basis of their
own evaluation and in accordance with their patient's best
interests.
The participation of health-care providers also fails to deal with
the fact that the court does not and cannot fully understand the
limitations of medical technology. Norplant is not an appropriate
contraception for all women. It is contraindicated for women who
have menstrual disorders, heart problems, acute liver disease,
diabetes, high cholesterol, high blood pressure, breast cancer,
or a history of blood clots. It is not effective in women who are
taking medications for seizures or tuberculosis or who weigh in
excess of 154 pounds. Its frequently reported side effects of "nervousness, mood changes and depression" hardly make it the contraception of choice for a woman who has already demonstrated
poor coping skills by abusing her children.
If the real goal of these courts is to stop child abuse and
neglect, and not to control a woman's reproductive behavior, then
certainly that should be done without utilizing coercive method
which both violate these women's constitutional rights and
threaten the integrity of their relationship with their health-care
providers . •
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values are unknown. Those instances might be John Doe cases
brought to an emergency room without known relatives, and irreversibly incompetent. Or they might be persons born with profound mental retardation and never able to express their wishes.
In cases like these the courts might resort to an objective
standard .
As a society we may be making a good game of subjective
standards - self-determination standards - while moving increasingly and rapidly towards an objective set of standards for
decision-making.
I think that 1990 was the high point of the subjective standard of patient self-determination. First there was Nancy Cruzan,
a thirty-three-year-old woman who died in December, 1990,
when her feeding tube was discontinued. Miss Cruzan was
twenty-five when she suffered a severe head injury in an
automobile accident, from which she never regained consciousness. She was cared for in a Missouri long-term-care
hospital where her main form of support was good nursing care
and food delivered through a gastrostomy tube. After four years
her parents asked the nursing home to stop Miss Cruzan's feedin
tube to allow her to die. When the nursing home refused, the
parents took the case to court. After a series of legal battles,
the case made its way to the United States Supreme Court.

continued from page 2

say what they want, or they can live a life with a set of values
and beliefs that can be perceived by a third party.
There is an alternative standard that most courts have shied
away from whenever a substitute judgment could be made: the
best-interest standard. The substitute-judgment standard is a subjective standard. It doesn't say, What would most people want
in these circumstances? Rather, it says, What would Mrs. Wanglie
want in these circumstances? based on who Mrs. Wanglie is and
what her values structure is.
The best-interest standard is believed to be an objective standard. Here one presumably doesn't know, or perhaps knows but
doesn't care, what the subjective values of the individual are and
imposes some external notion of the person's best interests. Were
not talking about trivial decisions in these cases; were talking
about life and death. We're dealing with the discontinuation of
life support so that someone may die. The best-interest standard asks, What objective criteria would incline me to discontinue life support in this case? What is important is that these
be regarded as fair, even-handed, and objective.
Up until now, courts have shied away from the best-interest
standard except in instances where the individual's subjective
6

The Supreme Court's decision stated loudly and clearly that
physicians should respect the wishes of competent adult patients.
ThiS was the fIrst time a major Federal court had constitutionalized
) he competent patient's right to make his or her own medical
decisions. By doing that, the Cruzan case provided Federal constitutional validation to the way medical practice had been evolving for the past thirty or forty years from an earlier emphasis
on medical paternalism to patient's active participation in making personal health-care choices. Seven of the nine judges indicated that the primary issue in such cases should be the patient's previously expressed wishes or intentions. The majority
opinion emphasized that a major concern was to insure that the
integrity and personal character of the now-incompetent patient
would be respected. Justice Renquist's majority opinion read:
"The choice between life and death is a deeply personal opinion
of obvious finality. We believe Missouri may legitimately seek
to safeguard the personal element of this choice through the
imposition of heightened evidentiary requirements:' But the
court in Cruzan is searching for that personal element of the
individual's choice. It was this emphasis on the personal choice
and personal values of the now-incompetent person that led
essentially eight of the nine justices to speak out in favor of what
are known as advance directives. Advance directives are either
Living Wills or Durable Powers of Attorney for Health Careboth of them health-care proxy arrangements. The key point
in stressing advance directives was that physicians should discuss
with competent patients in advance what their wishes might be
regarding life-sustaining treatment should they become
incompetent.
Justice O'Connor was particularly eloquent in stressing the
value of proxy decision-makers to protect the patient's personal
;hoice when the patient could not protect himself or herself.
You see why I think the Cruzan decision was a major event
in emphasizing patient self-determination, both for competent
and incompetent patients.
The other important 1990 event in this area was the Danforth Bill, a curious bill that sneaked through the House and
Senate in November of 1990 as part of the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act (page 1850 or thereabouts). It was not
discovered by anybody, not even the American Medical Association or the American Hospital Association, for a week or two
after it was passed. The Danforth Bill provides that upon being
admitted to a hospital or nursing home, patients must receive
written information about their state laws and their rights under
those laws with respect to end-of-life medical treatment. The
Act also requires institutions, both hospitals and nursing homes,
to record at the time of admission whether a patient has an advance directive-either a Living Will or a health-care proxy
-that would take effect if the patient lost decision-making
capacity. Finally, the Act requires that when patients are admitted into an institution they must be informed of the institution's
policies. If these policies conflict with patient wishes and values,
the patient can choose to go elsewhere.
All hospitals and nursing homes are expected to be in compliance with the Danforth Act by December 1, 1991.
Now some of the reasons for the Danforth Bill are clear. It
provides a mechanism to encourage the use of advance directives as urged by the Supreme Court in the Cruzan decision.
Public opinion polls have repeatedly demonstrated that patients
vant an opportunity to make their wishes known in advance
while they're still competent to do so.
Both the Danforth Bill and the Cruzan opinion strongly emphasize the value of knowing what a patient's individual beliefs

and preferences are. Otherwise, why do we bother to get advance directives from patients? Why would we encourage advance directives if it were not to try to learn in advance what
patients would wish when no longer able to speak to their own
interests?
The Wanglie case may be but a modest indicator of a changing attitude in society. Now decision-making authority, so reluctantly given up by doctors after those 2,500 years of medical
paternalism and so eagerly embraced by patients in that second
age-the age of the patient-may now be passing from both doctors and patients to third parties.
There are four ways in which I think patients' right of selfdetermination is being limited with respect to end-of-life decisions for the incompetent.
First, there's a question of whether autonomy is a one-way
or two-way street. It would be a hollow victory for patient selfdetermination if their only right to self-determination was to say,
Stop the treatment and let me die; and people were denied
positive rights, as the Wanglie family apparently is, to encourage
that treatment be maintained. There is a sense that the rights
that patients so eagerly sought may be limited to the right to
decline and say No without any commensurate right to say Yes
for continuation of support.
A second way in which self-determination is being compromised is by employing the so-called futility standard. Doctors
in the Wanglie case said that further treatment for Mrs. Wanglie
would be futile. This seems to be another approach to reassert
control over patient choices. Some group decides that if there's
only a 10 or 5 or 3 percent chance of "success" that efforts shall
be deemed futile. When they're deemed futile no further clinical,
ethical, or legal obligations would apply to the provider of
serVIces.
Who decides what percentage is regarded as futile is an important question. More importantly, who defines what goals are
being pursued that have been decided on as futile? In the Wanglie
case, trying to preserve Mrs. Wanglie's prior wishes, it was the
preservation of her continued existence that the family regarded
as a religious conviction on her part that they wish to defend.
From the doctor's point of view, the goal being pursued was
the restoration of Mrs. Wanglie's consciousness, which everybody agreed was not possible given the injuries she sustained
last May. But by determining which of those goals was the one
against which the futility standard would be applied was a very
powerful opportunity to override patient wishes. Here we're
discussing extreme cases of persistent vegetative state, but one
could imagine a futility standard being applied in early or
moderate Alzheimer's disease, severe mental retardation, or in
other congenital or acquired problems.
A third way, slightly different from futility, is what I call the
quality-of-life standard. Here a third party might say, not that
treatment is futile but that the quality of the patient's life is such
that treatment is not worthwhile. I'm not referring to an individual's own choice to refuse further kidney dialysis or cancer
chemotherapy or some other treatment. That would be a
straightforward statement of personal preferences. I'm referring
to a third-party assessment that the quality of somebody else's
life is such that it's not worth intervening, even though the intervention would achieve the specified goal (the continuation of
life, for example).
Finally, a fourth effort to overcome self-determination is application of a kind of social utility, social Darwinism, sometimes
couched in terms of rationing or allocation of scarce resources.
This begins with the elderly and incompetent, but could rapidly
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extend to other groups. Former Governor Richard Lamm of
Colorado has stated that "the elderly have a duty to die and get
out of the way so the America's industrial engine can be refueled:'
He swears he didn't say that, but three newspapers and two
or three television cameras caught him saying it. Not only that,
but he said it to a Denver church to a group of Gray Panthers,
so they were listening carefully. But the Lamm notion has been
said somewhat more carefully by Dan Callahan, Director of the
Hastings Center, in his 1987 book entitled Setting Limits:
Medical Goals In An Aging Society. Callahan depicts the elderly
as "a new social threat" and "a demographic, economic, and
medical avalanche" that could do great harm. Callahan suggests
using age as a specific criterion for the allocation and limitation
of health care by denying life-extending health care as a matter
of public policy to persons in their late seventies and eighties
or who have "lived out a natural lifespan:' Callahan wrote in a
New lOrk Times Op Ed article that "Nothing less than a full
rethinking of the relationship between medicine and old age will
resolve the problem of spiraling health costs:'
My conclusion, then, is that the secularization of bioethics
has permitted incursions of so-called value-free objective standards, legalisms and now, new economic and social utility standards. Instead of religious traditions that emphasize personal
values and beliefs, we have other traditions affecting our
bioethical interpretations. What we are witnessing with regard
to end-of-life decisions for incompetents is a shift from personal
values to social best-interest standards. We are likely to see these
standards applied next to end-of-life decisions for competent
adults, and soon to all patients regardless of the severity of their
illness or the strength of their preferences or beliefs. Some of
that has already happened in managed- care situations. That may
be part of the goal of so-called health outcome studies to decrease
reliance on subjective preferences and to substitute a social bestinterest test, eventually obviating the need even to hear about
patient or physician values or preferences. Patients will always
be encouraged to say No, but who will listen to them when they
say Yes? Who will hear them when physicians' discretion also
will be limited by third-party payers, by insurance companies
and government regulators?
I think we need a new model of the doctor-patient
relationship-one that is able to withstand the officiousness,
bureaucracy, efficiency, and control that is coming rapidly to
American medicine. There are few defenders of the old model.
Not even the bioethicists, who themselves usually come from
the secular traditions of philosophy, law or economics, will protect us from this brave new world.
In conclusion, we must do what we can to keep issues of cost
control separate from so-called death-with-dignity decisions and
end-of-life care. When the Reagan administration tried to have
people sign Living Wills at the same time they signed up for their
Medicare benefits, the AMA Board of Trustees was outraged.
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"Living Wills;' they said, "should be used for alleviating suffering and should not be linked to cost-containment objectives:'
My concerns are reinforced by the coming together of streams
of medical and ethical opinion along with torrents of governmenr
concerns about the cost of medical care. I think cost-containment
strategies already impose significant financial penalties upon providers who try to offer prolonged care for impaired patients, including the elderly. It may prove convenient and all too easy to
move from recognizing an individual's right to die to a climate
enforcing what Lamm referred to as a duty to die. I suggest that
efforts in this field be rechanneled from demonstrating that some
patients' quality of life is too poor, too meaningless to justify the
burden of continued life, toward the challenge of finding better
ways to improve the comfort and care and quality of life for such
patients.
The movement for death with dignity arose in response to
concerns of the public that medicine wasn't paying adequate attention to compassionate caring for patients, particularly dying
patients. It would be terribly ironic if this latest secular manifestation served to undercut the image of physician as caring and nurturing servant, and to undermine deep human values of caring
and compassion. The issue is complicated. The tradition of
medicine is a long one; therefore a slow and cautious approach
would seem advisable, one that seeks to restore the original
religious foundations of the American bioethics movement and
to overcome its secularization . •
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